When initiating and subsequently implementing activities in business areas, account is taken of risks the materialisation of which could contribute to the failure to achieve the strategic or operational objectives pursued, and which could adversely affect the ability of the organisation to ensure the operational continuity of both the national electricity system and PSE.

Identified risks are analysed and subject to systematic assessments in cooperation with risk owners. Risk management in each PE business area involves the systematic application of planned and coordinated measures, procedures and practices that reduce or eliminate the possibility of risk materialisation, to minimise the negative effects of their occurrence as well as to capitalise on their positive consequences.

Risk management activities, undertaken at the strategic and operational levels, are monitored. In accordance with PSE’s Risk Management Policy, this process covers all areas of the company’s operations.

PSE uses the Methodology for Risk Assessment at PSE S.A. and its subsidiaries, which is a fundamental document defining the conceptual and methodological basis used in the process of identifying, analysing and assessing risks of particular importance to PSE or the NPS.

The methodology and the accompanying tool solutions support, among others:

• identification of key risks associated with the functioning of the organisation, including, in particular, those relating to operating, maintenance and investment activities,
  
• assessment of identified risks, their quantification and presentation in the form of ranking,
  
• identifying cause-and-effect relationships and correlations between identified risks,
  
• determining the severity of the various types of causes leading to the materialisation of risks related to them,
  
• sensitivity analysis of risk parameters,
  
• identifying scenarios of catastrophic risks, i.e. risks with a very low probability of occurrence, yet with very large and severe consequences,
  
• ongoing monitoring of risks, including the monitoring of trends and providing synthetic management information on risks.
  

The process of identifying, assessing and monitoring of risks is supported by the risk monitoring system myRisk.On. It provides a knowledge base on the risks associated with PSE’s operations and the NPS.

At PSE, as part of the continuous improvement of organisational, process and technological solutions, initiatives are undertaken aimed both at improving the operational efficiency and security of the NPS and PSE, as well as reducing or managing risks more effectively.

The company’s risk register – selected risks as at the end of 2023

The PSE risk register includes the risks that are most relevant to the company and to the functioning of the NPS. According to the methodology adopted, for each identified risk, the potential causes and effects of their materialisation are determined, and the expected frequency of risk materialisation and the expected value of the effect are estimated. Other measures of risk can be determined as well, namely value-at-risk and expected shortfall. And so, in particular:

• in relation to the cause, understood as a specific event (or circumstance) the occurrence of which may lead to risk materialisation, the frequency of occurrence and conditional probability of risk materialisation after the occurrence of the cause (susceptibility) are determined,
  
• effects, understood as all (negative and positive) consequences of risk materialisation, are presented in 7 dimensions:
  
  • financial and material,
    
  • related to energy not supplied,
    
  • loss of load expectation,
    
  • reputational,
    
  • legal,
    
  • related to impact on health and life,
    
  • related to environmental impact.
    

PSE does not identify risks as social, environmental or climate risks. Factors of an environmental, social and climatic nature are treated as potential causes of materialisation of specific risk scenarios. In addition, when identifying risks that are relevant to PSE or NPS, it is determined each time whether a negative impact on the environment or the social environment is possible as a consequence of the materialisation of a given risk. This negative impact is expressed directly (as an effect on human health and life and the environment) or indirectly (as an effect of a reputational nature). Thus, social, environmental and climate impact factors are taken into account at the stage of identifying risks and defining their parameters (determining causes or effects).

The risk register also takes into account, starting from 2021, regional electricity crisis scenarios (SRKEE) that have been defined by ENTSO-E and deemed adequate in the case of Poland – as at the end of 2023, the register takes into account the SRKEE identified in the first edition of scenario identification and assessment, which took place in 2020.

Some of these are directly influenced by climatic factors, particularly extreme weather events as a consequence of climate change. These include extremely low temperatures, violent storms and hurricanes, torrential rains and floods, heat waves and droughts. Materialisation of this category of scenarios may affect the operation of transmission and distribution networks; in addition, it may negatively affect the operation of power plants and combined heat and power plants. As a result, they can lead to difficulties in supplying electricity to consumers.

Main risk causes

Failures of power units / generating units or the infrastructure necessary to evacuate power from these units caused by:

• Manufacturing defect,
• Workmanship errors,
• Incorrect operation and maintenance management,
• Human error,
• Degradation of infrastructure related to its long-standing use,
• Environmental impact,
• Construction disaster.
  

Risk description – basic information

As a result of the occurrence of one or more causes, a situation may arise in which dispatchable, controllable generating units lose their ability to generate or their ability to do so becomes significantly reduced. Power evacuation capability may also be disturbed. It becomes necessary to make appropriate adjustments in the operation of generating units, including their complete shutdown. This situation may overlap with a period when there is a need for scheduled maintenance of some power units / generating units, shutting down their operation with the NPS for many weeks / months.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Energy not supplied,
• Increased costs of removing congestions,
• Physical injury or loss of life sustained by third parties (of various magnitude) due to a blackout,
• Negative impact on the balance of the natural environment of various magnitude,
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.
  

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

Actions or solutions provided for in the Transmission Grid Code and SOGL to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply to consumers, including the application of measures and procedures provided for in the Defence and Restoration Plans.

These include but are not limited to:

• Monitoring of transmission grid elements when security levels are found to be at risk,
• Changes in repair plans for generating units,
• Change of the grid configuration,
• Arrangement on the supply or sale of capacity and energy from abroad in the framework of electricity exchange by operators under inter-TSO agreements,
• Use of resources provided for under the System Defence Plan,
• Generation and load curtailment.

Main risk causes

• Technical failure of substation equipment or gear,
• Loss of power supply to substation auxiliaries,
• Errors in readings or signals regarding the status of substation equipment or electricity parameters,
• Human error,
• Intentional action,
• Events resulting from environmental factors,
• Construction, land traffic or air traffic disaster.

Risk description – basic information

As a result of the occurrence of one or more causes, substation protection may be activated, which would result in the unplanned shutdown of one or more key components of an EHV substation. Direct damage or automatic shutdown of one or more key components of an EHV substation may occur. As a result, the transformation or distribution of electricity may be prevented or the substation’s ability to perform these tasks may be significantly reduced.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Substation restoration cost,
  
• Negative impact on the balance of the natural environment of various magnitude,
  
• Accidental event, including fatality,
  
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.
  

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

Comprehensive approach to grid asset management, including:

• Periodic assessments of the condition of substation gear,
• Replacement of the most depreciated and oldest components or equipment,
• Experienced and competent team to ensure safe maintenance,
• Use of physical security solutions or station access restrictions,
• Direct supervision of external companies carrying out work on substation facilities.

Main risk causes

• Unfavourable interaction of interconnected European wholesale electricity markets, including Polish commodity markets, as well as interaction with technical markets – significantly deviating from assumptions,
• An unfavourable situation in other markets significantly deviating from assumptions,
• Prices of carbon emission allowances, including their persistence at higher levels for a longer period of time,
• Electricity demand significantly lower than projected (at the stage of formulating the tariff application – transmission tariff).

Risk description – basic information

The occurrence of one or more causes results in an increased scale of ESC reallocation between active Scheduled Generating Units (JGwa), which may lead to an increased volume of cleared USE reallocation or an increased volume of settled balancing energy or redispatching energy. Revenue from the quality fee may decrease. The scale of these activities may be higher than assumed in the tariff application and in the financial plan. The above may be correlated with an unexpected change in the level of market energy prices (MEPs). Excessive allocation restrictions may also be a negative factor. This translates into the need for PSE to incur total balancing market costs higher than those assumed in the financial plan and compensated by tariff revenue. This condition may affect the total result on the quality fee and, under extreme conditions, the liquidity of PSE.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Negative balance of the quality fee revenue,
  
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

• Monitoring of the Company’s financial exposure in the context of the rules of Balancing Market mechanisms,
• A system-based solution which provides for a possibility to submit a request for the Tariff adjustment to the ERO President during the year,
• The functioning of the regulatory account for quality fee revenue,
• The rules of the Balancing Market have been amended to reduce opportunities for price arbitrage on the part of generators when reallocation results from power plant minimum generation volumes reported by generators (the amendments took effect in 2024). 

Main risk causes

• Delays in tendering procedures and awarding contracts,
• Obstructions or omissions during planning work,
• Prolonged process of obtaining administrative or environmental decisions,
• Errors or delays in the preparation of project documentation,
• The contractor’s errors or delays in carrying out construction and assembly works (including on related projects),
• Defective or delayed delivery of materials or equipment,
• Limitations or inability to obtain necessary exemptions,
• Occurrence of extreme weather events,
• Disputes, conflicts with the contractor,
• Difficulties or delays in obtaining land titles,
• Construction disaster, land traffic disaster or fire.

Risk description – basic information

If one or more of these causes occur, there are delays in investment project implementation. The remedial or corrective actions taken may prove ineffective or allow only part of the impediments and resulting delays to be removed. Delays pile up and reach levels that exceed several or more months. They may additionally translate into increased delays regarding other, related investment projects.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Costs associated with e.g. the need to extend the line route, increased time to engage personnel resources, legal services,
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.

 Approach to risk management – main assumptions

• Project schedule and budget management, contractor and subcontractor contract management,
• Identification and assessment of risks at the project level,
• Supply management and identification of possible defects in the goods supplied,
• Outage planning,
• Planning and managing changes to the project and contract with the contractor,
• Planning the technical elements of the investment process,
• PSE - PGL LP (State Forests) Agreement.
  

Main risk causes

• Limitation of the contractor’s ability to carry out the work through loss of key personnel, equipment shortages or organisational and planning problems,
• Loss of a key subcontractor by the contractor.

Risk description – basic information

As a result of the occurrence of one or more causes, including those occurring at the same time, PSE may immediately suffer implementation difficulties, a reduction in the scale of commitment on the part of the contractor, failure to meet established deadlines. In extreme cases, either immediately or after a few days or weeks the contractor may completely stop carrying out the tasks assigned to them. Withholding of payments by the contractor to subcontractors may occur. An investment (one or many) may remain on hold for many weeks, which may also affect the implementation of related tasks carried out so far without disruption. Disturbances in investment processes can extend to the entire portfolio of PSE grid investment projects.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Cost of actions taken by PSE in response to the contractor’s cessation of work of various magnitude,
• Increased cost of carrying out part of the work under one or more key projects due to the need to select a new contractor for only part of the work,
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

• Monitoring risks relevant to project implementation, including those related to the financial situation of contractors, the contractor’s human resources and equipment resources, ability to carry out work smoothly,
• Carrying out supervision and monitoring of the work within various investment tasks, including but not limited to management of the project schedule and budget, management of the contract with the Contractor and with subcontractors, tracking deviations from the contractual schedule and the reasons for their occurrence, analysing the status and evaluation of deviations, identification of indirect risks. 

Main risk causes

• Determination by control bodies of PSE’s violation of the rules set out in the funding agreement for state aid,
• The contractor’s breach of generally applicable national and EU laws during the implementation of the project, violation of the terms of contract or the rules set out in the funding agreement,
• No EC approval to grant state aid or the so-called “contribution to a major project” for the implementation of PSE’s investment tasks.

Risk description – basic information

As a result of one or more causes, PSE takes action to clarify the situation. However, these actions may fail to achieve the outcome, as a result of which PSE may lose the opportunity to obtain a certain amount of subsidy or become obliged to return it (in whole or in part) with interest. Consequently, part of capital expenditure (which has been or was to be financed by grant aid) must be financed with PSE’s own funds or from other sources.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude,
• Repayment of the subsidy amount with interest or no subsidy awarded.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

• Ongoing supervision of work carried out by contractors, due diligence at the project preparation stage, monitoring of delays and their causes, as well as taking actions to ensure timely implementation of the project, performing checks or supervisory reviews regarding the Company’s compliance with the requirements or obligations under the grant agreement and the provisions of national and EU law,
• Maintaining provisions in contracts with contractors regarding requirements under the funding agreement and the contractor’s responsibility to comply with grant requirements,
• Ongoing cooperation, during inspections, with controlling institutions,
• Support of specialised advisors in the development of solutions in accordance with applicable legislation,
• Obtaining legal opinions confirming compliance of PSE’s activities with the applicable legislation,
• Cooperation with the government administration on elements that require agreement with the European Commission and providing information on an ongoing basis on the progress of the investment project and cooperation with the Commission,
• Preparing applications to the European Commission to justify compliance of aid requested by PSE with EU law.
  

Main risk causes

• Permanent outage of a controllable unit with a significant capacity volume, which has been operating in the NPS until now,
• Failure to integrate a new controllable generating unit with a significant capacity volume and a high availability index, or a long delay in relation to the assumptions made for its inclusion into the NPS,
• A significant decrease in the availability of a controllable unit with a significant capacity volume, which has been operating in the NPS,
• Failure to integrate an uncontrollable dispatchable generating unit with a significant power volume but a low availability index into the NPS.

Risk description – basic information

The occurrence of one or more causes results in a structural deficit of domestic available capacity. With the gradual build-up of the deficit, there is a systematic repetition of forecasts indicating that in the following years or months the national capacity reserves will be below the required level. In the event of a rapid emergence of such a state, a condition is seen to develop where national power reserves are lower than the required level. At the same time, it may be difficult to replenish the balance with commercial in the import direction, adversely affecting the NPS’s operational security and its ability to meet demand uninterruptedly. The development of a permanent state of deficit of domestic reserves, or approaching it, may subsequently, indirectly, into the formation (increase) of prices in electricity markets.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Increased costs of removing congestions,
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude,
• Energy not supplied.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

• Conducting generation adequacy analyses and reporting their results or conclusions to decision-makers at the central government or regulatory levels,
• Implementation and ensuring the proper functioning of the power market,
• Formal solutions to ensure maximum availability on the generation side,
• Available tools for demand control.
  

Main risk causes

• Lack of operational capacity on the part of PSE to ensure operation of network investments included in the Transmission Grid Development Plan (TGDP),
• PSE’s inability to incur the capital expenditure necessary to complete grid projects under the TGDP,
• Contractors’ inability to proceed with the execution of projects and complete them on time,
• Lack of capacity on the part of manufacturers of materials or equipment to produce them within the timeframe assumed by the PSE.

Risk description – basic information

As a result of the occurrence of one or more causes, a situation may arise in which:

• PSE will be forced to make decisions to abandon parts of the TGDP,
• PSE will decide to delay the implementation of a task or multiple tasks by a year or more relative to the TGDP,
• The tendering procedure will not close with an award due to a lack of tenders or the successful tenderer does not sign the contract, as a result of which PSE decides to abandon or delay the project concerned for a year or more.

This distorts the process of implementing the TGDP as a whole, including a potential adverse effect on the legitimacy or ability to complete other grid investment projects on time.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude,
• Contractual penalties of various magnitudes resulting from failure to connect a generating unit on time.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

• Monitoring of risks relevant to the implementation of the TGDP, including all investment tasks provided for in that document,
• Conducting day-to-day supervision and monitoring of work under individual investment tasks.
  

Main causes

• Formation during the winter period, under the influence of a static atmospheric front, of weather conditions that are characterised by a significant drop and prolonged persistence (for at least 14-21 days) of air temperature of -10 to -15oC and colder.
  

Risk description – basic information

As a result of such weather conditions, the following may develop gradually or rapidly, sometimes simultaneously:

• Increase in energy demand,
• Constraints in the operation of utility power plants cooled by water from rivers or lakes,
• Increased failure rate of conventional units and difficulties related to limitations in fuel supply (hard coal),
• Reductions in the volume of power supplied to the system by wind farms, along with lower efficiency of photovoltaic sources,
• Decreased availability of selected distribution or transmission lines due to their icing, as well as increased failure rates of selected substation or line equipment.

Removing these constraints may be either impossible or significantly hampered by the difficult conditions in which operation and maintenance services have to work.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Increased costs of removing congestion,
• The cost of repairing and maintaining the equipment that makes up the transmission infrastructure,
• Energy not supplied,
• Accidental event, including fatality,
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

Actions provided for in the Transmission Grid Code and SOGL to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply to consumers, including the application of measures and procedures provided for in the Defence and Restoration Plans.

These include but are not limited to:

• Monitoring the level and temperature of cooling water in open-cycle power plants,
• Monitoring weather forecasts for developments affecting demand, generation, capacity and monitoring the occurrence of extreme weather conditions,
• Monitoring of fuel stocks available to power plants.

Main causes

Large-scale occurrence of one or more cases of:

• Icing,
• Snow cornices,
• Catastrophic buildup of rime ice.

Risk description – basic information

The occurrence of such weather phenomena may cause, throughout the area of their impact, damage to line facilities (including conductors and tower structures) and emergency, including automatic, shutdowns of transmission lines. Due to the prevailing weather conditions, repair and restoring line facilities to service may be prolonged. Under such conditions, lines that are still in operation can become overloaded. There may be violations of the n-1 rule. 

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Negative impact on the balance of the natural environment,
• Accidental event, including fatality,
• Increased costs of removing congestions,
• Energy not supplied,
• High costs of restoring the substation or line to its original condition, including the cost of restoring or replacing its essential components,
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude.

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

Actions provided for in the Transmission Grid Code and SOGL to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply to consumers, including the application of measures and procedures provided for in the Defence and Restoration Plans.

These include but are not limited to:

• Monitoring weather forecasts for developments affecting demand, generation and transmission capacity,
• Monitoring the occurrence of extreme weather conditions,
• Preventive actions in planning and operational management of the NPS.

Main causes

• Violent thunderstorm phenomena (heavy lightning strikes) for up to 3 days, which may be accompanied by strong or gusty winds and heavy rainfall,
• Hurricanes (average speeds above 120 km/h, with gusts up to 200 km/h),
• Tornadoes.

Risk description – basic information

The occurrence of such weather phenomena may lead to sudden, sometimes simultaneously recorded unplanned outages of many EHV lines. There may be impediments to the operation of a considerable number of key components of EHV substations. This situation may concern sensitive elements of the transmission network. They may be physically damaged or show down automatically due to the tripping of protection devices. This may lead to violations of the N-1 rule, accompanied by the overloading of other grid elements. This condition may persist for up to several days, including due to difficulties in repairing damaged transmission infrastructure elements.

Main effects of risk materialisation

• Accidental event or loss of life sustained by third parties due to a blackout (of various magnitude),
  
• Negative impact on the balance of the natural environment,
  
• Increased costs of removing congestions,
• Costs of restoring the substation or line to its original condition, including the cost of restoring or replacing its essential components,
  
• Negative reputational effects of various magnitude,
  
• Energy not supplied.
  

Approach to risk management – main assumptions

Actions provided for in the Transmission Grid Code and SOGL to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply to consumers, including the application of measures and procedures provided for in the Defence and Restoration Plans.

These include but are not limited to:

• Maintaining O&M personnel prepared to deal with grid facility failures,
• Monitoring weather forecasts for the occurrence and magnitude of extreme weather events,
• Installation of lightning protection infrastructure components in accordance with relevant standards,
• Providing engineering systems that drain rainwater effectively,
• Conducting periodic inspections of the substation grounds and the immediate surroundings of the facilities,
• Preventive actions in planning and operational management of the NPS.
  

Przyczyny ryzyka:

• szybki wzrost temperatury wiosną po śnieżnej zimie,
• obfite opady deszczu prowadzące do podniesienia się poziomu wód powierzchniowych oraz gruntowych, podtopień lub zalania.

Opis ryzyka - podstawowe informacje

Wystąpienie takich zjawisk pogodowych, może prowadzić do podtopień na wielu obszarach kraju, w tym potencjalnie również na skutek przerwania wałów powodziowych. Sytuacja ta może dotknąć m.in.: terenów elektrowni, elementów infrastruktury przesyłowej lub dystrybucyjnej, kopalni odkrywkowych węgla brunatnego. W konsekwencji, przez dłuższy czas, mogą utrzymywać się utrudnienia, również z uwagi na ograniczenia po stronie służb eksploatacyjnych w dokonywaniu napraw. Dostępność części jednostek wytwórczych lub możliwość wyprowadzenia z nich mocy może być ograniczona.

Główne skutki materializacji ryzyka:

• koszty wymiany lub naprawy uszkodzonych elementów lub urządzeń stacyjnych lub liniowych,
• zwiększony koszt usuwania ograniczeń sieciowych,
• negatywne skutki wizerunkowe o różnej skali,
• energia niedostarczona.

Podejście do zarządzania ryzykiem - główne założenia

Działania, przewidziane w IRiESP i SO GL, mające na celu zapewnienie niezakłóconych dostaw energii do odbiorców, w tym stosowanie środków i procedur przewidzianych w Planach obrony i odbudowy. Realizowane są m.in.:

• utrzymywanie w gotowości służb eksploatacyjnych przygotowanych do usuwania awarii obiektów sieciowych,
• monitoring prognoz pogody pod kątem występowania oraz skali ekstremalnych zjawisk pogodowych,
• stosowanie rozwiązań technicznych odprowadzających w sposób skuteczny wody opadowe, ograniczających możliwość zalania stacji lub podmycia słupów,
• przeprowadzanie okresowych przeglądów terenów stacji i bezpośredniego otoczenia obiektów infrastruktury przesyłowej, celem zweryfikowania właściwego stanu ustanowionych zabezpieczeń,
• budowanie stacji oraz stawianie słupów w miejscach nienarażonych na częste podtopienia lub zalania,
• prewencyjne działania planistyczne.

Przyczyna ryzyka:

• brak opadów przez okres przynajmniej 3-5 tygodni powiązany ze znacznym spadkiem poziomu wód powierzchniowych i gruntowych.

Opis ryzyka - podstawowe informacje

Wystąpienie takich warunków pogodowych, może prowadzić do stopniowego, w tym równoczesnego: spadku wydajności dużej części jednostek wytwórczych wykorzystujących do celów chłodzenia wodę pochodzącą z wód powierzchniowych, a także ograniczania dostępności lub niższej wydajności elektrowni wodnych w związku z bardzo niskim poziomem wód. Usuwanie ww. ograniczeń może być niemożliwe albo istotnie utrudnione, w tym z uwagi na brak możliwości podejmowania skutecznych działań przez służby eksploatacyjne jednostek wytwórczych. Może dojść do ograniczenia poziomu wytwarzania. Przy braku spadku zapotrzebowania na energię elektryczną, może to wpłynąć na utrudnienia w zapewnieniu bilansowania KSE.

Główne skutki materializacji ryzyka:

• zwiększony koszt usuwania ograniczeń sieciowych,
• negatywne skutki wizerunkowe o różnej skali,
• energia niedostarczona.

Podejście do zarządzania ryzykiem - główne założenia

Działania, przewidziane w IRiESP i SO GL, mające na celu zapewnienie niezakłóconych dostaw energii do odbiorców, w tym stosowanie środków i procedur przewidzianych w Planach obrony i odbudowy.

Realizowane są m.in.:

• monitorowanie poziomu wody chłodzącej elektrownie z otwartym obiegiem,
• monitorowanie prognozy pogody mającej wpływ na zapotrzebowanie, wytwarzanie, zdolności przesyłowe oraz monitorowanie występowania ekstremalnych warunków atmosferycznych.

Przyczyny ryzyka

Wystąpienie i rozprzestrzenienie się pożarów na terenach leśnych z uwagi na:

• utrzymującą się suszę,
• wysokie temperatury powierza,
• silny wiatr.

Opis ryzyka - podstawowe informacje

Pożar może rozprzestrzenić się na teren sąsiadujący z linią lub stacją, a następnie objąć również pas gruntu znajdujący się bezpośrednio pod linią. Dochodzić może do: automatycznych wyłączeń niektórych linii (w niektórych przypadkach również stacji) NN lub ograniczenia ich możliwości przesyłowych, uszkodzenia obiektów liniowych lub stacyjnych NN. Konieczne może być wyłączenie linii lub stacji NN tak, aby umożliwić bezpieczne gaszenie pożaru przez straż pożarną oraz prowadzenie działań przez inne służby. Skala negatywnych oddziaływań może być wzmacniana przez fakt, że duża część linii przesyłowych zlokalizowana jest na terenach leśnych.

Główne skutki materializacji ryzyka:

• koszty wymiany lub naprawy uszkodzonych elementów lub urządzeń stacyjnych lub liniowych,
• zwiększony koszt usuwania ograniczeń sieciowych,
• zdarzenie wypadkowe, utrata życia przez osoby postronne w związku z wystąpieniem blackout-u o różnym zasięgu,
• negatywne skutki wizerunkowe o różnej skali,
• energia niedostarczona.

Podejście do zarządzania ryzykiem - główne założenia

Działania, przewidziane w IRiESP i SO GL, mające na celu zapewnienie niezakłóconych dostaw energii do odbiorców, w tym stosowanie środków i procedur przewidzianych w Planach obrony i odbudowy.

Realizowane są m.in.:

• monitorowanie prognozy pogody,
• utrzymywanie odpowiedniej odległości między słupami lub liniami i stacjami, a terenami zalesionymi, w tym (w ramach działań eksploatacyjnych) systematyczne wycinanie roślinności (drzew) wyrastających w obszarze pasa, w ramach którego poprowadzona jest linia przesyłowa.

Przyczyna ryzyka:

• wiele równoczesnych lub zachodzących w krótkim odstępie czasu awarii wywołanych ekstremalnymi warunkami pogodowymi – fala upałów.

Opis ryzyka - podstawowe informacje

Wystąpienie licznych, równoczesnych awarii spowodowanych ekstremalnymi warunkami pogodowymi, prowadzić może następnie do awarii kolejnych elementów składowych sieci przesyłowej lub instalacji nie należących do OSP, wspierających jednak działanie KSE (np. generatory, kompensatory). Może im towarzyszyć brak lub ograniczona zdolność służb eksploatacyjnych do usuwania wielu równoczesnych awarii. Krytyczne elementy systemu zostają utracone, możliwe jest wystąpienie kaskadowych wyłączeń, co narusza stabilność pracy systemu. Mogą występować ograniczenia lub utrata dostępności usług pomocniczych. 

Główne skutki materializacji ryzyka:

• negatywne oddziaływanie na równowagę środowiska przyrodniczego,
• zdarzenie wypadkowe, utrata życia przez osoby postronne w związku z wystąpieniem blackout-u o różnym zasięgu,
• zwiększony koszt usuwania ograniczeń sieciowych,
• koszty przywrócenia infrastruktury przesyłowej do stanu wyjściowego, w tym odtworzenia lub wymiany jej istotnych elementów,
• negatywne skutki wizerunkowe o różnej skali,
• energia niedostarczona.

Podejście do zarządzania ryzykiem - główne założenia:

• prewencyjne wymiany najbardziej wyeksploatowanych i najstarszych elementów majątku sieciowego,
• doświadczona kadra obsługująca stacje,
• umowy z wyspecjalizowanymi firmami zewnętrznymi świadczącymi wsparcie w przypadku występowania zdarzeń awaryjnych,
• wprowadzenie ograniczeń w dostarczaniu i poborze energii elektrycznej,
• monitorowanie elementów sieci przesyłowej w sytuacji stwierdzenia zagrożenia poziomów bezpieczeństwa,
• zmiana konfiguracji sieci,
• uzgodnienie dostaw lub sprzedaży mocy i energii z zagranicy w ramach operatorskiej wymiany energii elektrycznej na podstawie umów międzyoperatorskich,

• monitorowanie prognozy pogody mającej wpływ na zapotrzebowanie, wytwarzanie, zdolności przesyłowe oraz występowanie ekstremalnych warunków atmosferycznych.